


























































    
he report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of 
the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (U.N. Mission), 
released in September 2013, confirmed that “chemical weapons have been 
used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Repub-
lic, [as well as] against civilians, including children, on a relatively large 
scale.”1 In a note accompanying the report, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations condemned the use of chemical weapons as “a war crime 
and grave violation of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare and other relevant rules of customary international 
law.”2  
Although attention in recent months has focused on the atrocities 
caused by the use of chemical weapons in Syria, throughout the course of 
the conflict a much wider range of potentially criminal conduct has taken 
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place. In August 2013, the Independent International Commission of In-
quiry on the Syrian Arab Republic reported massacres and unlawful kill-
ings, arbitrary arrests and unlawful detention, hostage taking, enforced dis-
appearance, torture and ill-treatment, sexual violence, violation of chil-
dren’s rights, unlawful attacks, attacks on protected persons and objects, 
pillaging and destruction of property, use of illegal weapons (including 
chemical weapons), sieges and attacks on food security.3 The report sug-
gests that a broad array of war crimes and crimes against humanity have 
been committed on Syrian territory by both government forces and anti-
government armed groups.4  
Individuals responsible for these serious crimes must be held account-
able for their actions. International criminal justice plays an important role 
in responding to the commission of international crimes. The investigation 
and prosecution of individuals serves a variety of purposes, from retribu-
tion to deterrence to establishment of the truth.5 Perhaps most importantly, 
the international criminal justice process has been understood to provide a 
foundation for future peace by breaking down assumptions of collective 
guilt, creating a basis for reconciliation and preventing calls for revenge.6  
In the absence of domestic criminal proceedings, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), which came into operation in 2002 and has prospec-
tive jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the internation-
al community,7 provides perhaps the most obvious venue to hold account-
able those who have committed serious crimes in Syria. Other possible set-
tings include an ad hoc international criminal tribunal created under the 
Chapter VII powers of the United Nations Security Council,8 an interna-
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tionalized criminal tribunal with domestic and international elements,9 and 
the domestic courts of third States operating on the basis of universal ju-
risdiction. The remainder of this article will examine the possible institu-
tions in which justice may be sought for the crimes committed in Syria. It 
concludes by emphasizing the benefits of a multi-layered response, com-
bining both domestic and international(ized) institutions.  
 
 
II. POSSIBLE VENUES FOR JUSTICE 
 
A. Domestic Courts in Syria 
 
Syrian authorities are under an obligation to investigate and prosecute 
those suspected of having committed international crimes on Syrian terri-
tory.10 This obligation has its basis in both customary and conventional in-
ternational law.11 There are several advantages to the pursuit of justice in 
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Kampuchea (2001), amended by NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_Law_as_amended_ 
27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf; Law of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court, No. 10 (Oct. 9, 2005), 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq, No. 4006 (Oct. 18, 2005); Statute of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007); 
War Crimes Chamber of  Bosnia and Herzegovina, State Court, Special Department for 
War Crimes in the State Prosecutor’s Office  (Mar. 9, 2005), http://www.sudbih.gov 
.ba/?jezik=e. 
10. The obligation on State authorities to prosecute international crimes committed in 
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Syrian Arab Republic. See U.N. Gen. Assembly, Human Rights Council, Report of the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶¶ 21–24, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50 (Aug. 16, 2012). 
11. A customary obligation in international and non-international armed conflict has 
been recognized by the ICRC. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2 
volumes) r. 158 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter 
Customary IHL Study]. An obligation to prosecute in respect of acts of torture can also be 
found under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment and Punishment arts. 5, 7, June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The scope of this 













the domestic courts of States on whose territory crimes are committed. 
These include the potential for greater impact within the local population 
and access to evidence and perpetrators that exceeds that of the other op-
tions, all of which rely on State cooperation.  
The pursuit of justice at the domestic level in Syria is, however, un-
likely while the conflict continues.12 Even when the conflict ends, domestic 
courts can be expected to face difficulties overseeing the investigation and 
prosecution of the complex international crimes that have been committed 
in their own State. The construction of domestic capacity in the aftermath 
of the conflict is crucial in light of the limited capacity of international 
criminal justice institutions, such as the ICC, an internationalized tribunal 
and third States, to oversee the investigation and prosecution of a large 
number of cases. The strengthening of domestic criminal justice institu-
tions is necessary to ensure that individuals who cannot be investigated and 
prosecuted elsewhere do not go unpunished.13 
 
B. The International Criminal Court 
 
The ICC is intended to act as a “court of last resort,” which operates in the 
absence of genuine proceedings at the domestic level.14 Cases are admissi-
ble before the ICC if they are not being, and have not been, investigated or 
prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction, and if they are of sufficient gravity 
to justify further action by the Court.15 The ICC provides a possible route 
to justice in the absence of genuine proceedings at the domestic level. In 
many respects the ICC is well placed to address the crimes allegedly com-
mitted in Syria. The Court is an established institution with the capacity to 
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investigate and prosecute complex international crimes cases.16 It is less 
susceptible to bias than domestic courts and may be less likely to spark fur-
ther conflict in the region.17 For this reason, it may provide an appropriate 
forum for proceedings against higher-level perpetrators that may be more 
politically charged and destabilizing.  
There are, however, a number of difficulties associated with the ICC as 
a forum for justice in Syria. One key issue is that of triggering the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Since Syria is not a State party to the Rome Statute, a referral 
from the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter, is required to trigger the jurisdiction of the Court.18 A State 
party to the Rome Statute cannot refer the situation to the ICC; nor can the 
Prosecutor initiate an investigation proprio motu.19 The Security Council has 
already made two referrals to the ICC, in relation to the situation in Darfur, 
Sudan, in 2005 and that in Libya in 2011.20 Whilst some members of the 
Security Council, including the U.K. and France, have supported the refer-
ral of the situation in Syria to the ICC, the U.S., China and Russia, each of 
which holds the power to veto action by the Security Council, have not 
supported such a move.21 Russia is reported to have described a referral as 
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before the ICC, see Situations and Cases, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situa 
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19. Id. 
20. See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).   
21. Amnesty International has identified 64 countries that support a referral of the 
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zerland, together with the governments of 56 States, including the U.K. and France, re-
quested the Security Council “to act by referring the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic 
as of March 2011 to the International Criminal Court (ICC) without exceptions and irre-
spective of the alleged perpetrators.” See Letter from the Permanent Mission of Switzer-














“ill-timed and counterproductive.”22 Therefore, a referral from the Security 
Council is, for the time being, unlikely.  
It would, of course, be possible for a post-conflict government in Syria 
to ratify the Rome Statute and refer its own situation to the ICC or permit 
the Prosecutor to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of her proprio motu pow-
ers of investigation.23 The ICC has already received a number of referrals 
from States concerning crimes committed on their territory.24 Self-referrals 
have been criticized as an abdication of responsibility to investigate and 
prosecute on the part of domestic authorities.25 However, such referrals are 
both consistent with the text of the Rome Statute and its object and pur-
pose, which is to ensure that individuals are held accountable for the com-
mission of international crimes in situations where justice is not sought at 
the domestic level.26 Another option would be for the Syrian authorities to 
accept the jurisdiction of the ICC under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, 
which would allow the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation proprio motu.27  
It is important that any future referral from the Security Council or a 
State party to the Rome Statute does not undermine the independence of 
the ICC by seeking to limit the scope of the referral to one side of the con-
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only have jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed after entry into force of the Rome 
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26. See Darryl Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, 21 CRIMINAL 
LAW FORUM 67 (2010). 
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flict.28 Where States have attempted to do so in the past, the Prosecutor has 
interpreted the referral to include all crimes committed within the territo-
ry.29 If the Security Council was to refer one side of a conflict to the ICC, 
the Prosecutor could refuse to initiate an investigation under Article 
53(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, which requires the Prosecutor to determine 
that an investigation would be in the interests of justice.30 
Another difficulty raised by prosecutions at the ICC is the Court’s reli-
ance on the cooperation of States to oversee the criminal justice process. If 
the jurisdiction of the Court is triggered and the Prosecutor decides to ini-
tiate an investigation, the Court will be heavily dependent on State coop-
eration to gain access to evidence, transfer perpetrators to the Court, pro-
tect witnesses and so on. Past practice has shown that State cooperation 
has not always been forthcoming in relation to situations that have been 
referred to the ICC by the Security Council, despite the existence of an ob-
ligation to cooperate in the Security Council resolution making the refer-
ral.31 Moreover, whilst a self-referral from Syrian authorities may initially be 
                                                                                                                      
28. For discussion as to whether or not the Security Council could restrict a referral to 
the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons, see Kevin Jon Heller, Could the Security 
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29. Following the Ugandan self-referral in December 2003, the Office of the Prosecu-
tor of the ICC “informed the Government of Uganda that, in compliance with its obliga-
tions of impartiality, the Office would interpret the referral to include all crimes commit-
ted within Northern Uganda.” See Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the Activities Per-
formed during the First Three Years (June 2003–June 2006), 25 (Sept. 12, 2006), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D76A5D89-FB64-47A9-9821-725747378AB2/ 
143680/OTP_3yearreport20060914_English.pdf. However, the Prosecutor has subse-
quently been criticized for failing to address both sides of the conflict. See William A. 
Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Creative Solutions or a Trap for the Court?, in THE INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 36 (Mauro Politi & Federica 
Gioia eds., 2008).  
30. See also Heller, supra note 28.  
31. See Göran Sluiter, Obtaining Cooperation from Sudan—Where is the Law? 6 JOURNAL 













accompanied by State cooperation, this could easily be lost following a 
change in government or the decision of the Prosecutor to investigate the 
conduct of State officials,32 rendering the Court ineffective. 
A further issue associated with the ICC as a forum for justice concerns 
the Court’s substantive jurisdiction. It is not clear from the text of the 
Rome Statute whether the Court has jurisdiction to address the use of 
chemical weapons. Reference to chemical weapons was removed from the 
Statute during the drafting process as a compromise for States that felt 
chemical and biological weapons should not be included in the Statute if 
nuclear weapons were left out.33 Nevertheless, the Statute was adopted with 
three provisions that could be read to encompass chemical weapons.34  
These provisions do not, however, apply to non-international armed 
conflicts, such as the conflict in Syria.35 During the first Review Conference 
of the Rome Statute in 2010, Article 8 was amended to prohibit the use of 
the same range of weapons in a non-international armed conflict that are 
not permitted in the context of an international armed conflict.36 Some 
ambiguity exists as to the entry into force of the provisions and the ability 
of the ICC to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of a referral from the Secu-
rity Council.37 Putting these issues to one side, the question remains as to 
                                                                                                                      
32. Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of “Self-Referrals” a Sound Start for the ICC?, 2 JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 950 (2004). 
33. SCHABAS, supra note 25, at 138.  
34. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 8(2)(b)(ii) (prohibiting “employing poison or poi-
soned weapons); Id., art. 8(2)(b)(xviii) (prohibiting “employing asphyxiating, poisonous or 
other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices”); and id., art. 8(2)(b)(xx) (pro-
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cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in 
violation of the international law of armed conflict . . . .”).  
35. See Syria: ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent Maintain Aid Effort Amid Increased 
Fighting, ICRC (July 17, 2012), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update 
/2012/syria-update-2012-07-17.htm.  
36. Amendments to the Rome Statute, RC/Res. 5 (2010). See also Amal Alamuddin 
and Philippa Webb, Expanding Jurisdiction over War Crimes under Article 8 of the ICC Statute, 
8(5) JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1219 (2010). 
37. The amendment is stated to “enter into force in accordance with article 121, para-
graph 5 of the Statute.” Amendments to the Rome Statute, supra note 36, ¶ 1.  It is unclear 
from the text of Article 121(5) whether the ICC could exercise jurisdiction in relation to 
the crimes listed in the amendment following referral by the Security Council. For discus-
sion, see Dapo Akande, Can the ICC Prosecute for Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria?, 













whether or not the provisions can be interpreted to include the use of 
chemical weapons.38  
Another approach would be to bring charges for the war crime of in-
tentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.39 The use of chemical 
weapons may also constitute a crime against humanity under the Rome 
Statute if it amounts to a “widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack” and results in one or 
more of the prohibited acts listed in the Rome Statute, such as murder or 
torture.40 It is worth noting that Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which pro-
vides the Court with jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, requires the 
prohibited acts to be carried out “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State 
or organizational policy to commit such an attack.”41  
Even if the ICC does exercise jurisdiction and gains the State support 
required to bring perpetrators to justice, it could only ever provide a partial 
response to the atrocities committed in Syria. The ICC is a court of limited 
capacity and as such is restricted to trying a small number of perpetrators. 
If the jurisdiction of the ICC is triggered, the Prosecutor is likely to follow 
its policy of focusing on those bearing greatest responsibility for crimes 
committed on the territory,42 leaving the crimes of lower level perpetrators 
to be addressed elsewhere.  
                                                                                                                      
38. For discussion see id.; Heller, supra note 28. 
39. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 8(2)(e)(i).  
40. Id., arts. 7(1)(a) and (f).  
41. Id., art. 7(2)(a). In its decision of March 31, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC 
interpreted the concept of an organization under Article 7(2)(a) to include non-State enti-
ties. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No., ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant 
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OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (2010).  
42. In a policy paper released in 2003, the Office of the Prosecutor stated its policy, in 
light of the limited resources available to the Court: “On the one hand it will initiate pros-
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will encourage national prosecutions, where possible, for the lower-ranking perpetrators, 
or work with the international community to ensure that the offenders are brought to 
justice by some other means.”  See Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues 















C. An Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal 
 
The formation of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal, similar to that 
created for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda under the Security Coun-
cil’s Chapter VII powers, would offer an alternative to prosecution before 
the ICC.43 The establishment of an international criminal tribunal for Syria 
was proposed by a group of U.S. congressmen in September 2013.44 This 
approach is questionable for two reasons. First, the creation of such a tri-
bunal would be dependent on the will of the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. It is clear from the refusal of the Security 
Council to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC that there is currently in-
sufficient will to allow an international criminal justice institution to over-
see the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed on the territory.  
Second, even if such will did exist, it would be more efficient and 
cost effective to refer the situation to the ICC rather than to establish an-
other ad hoc institution in the image of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR).45 One of the key benefits of establishing the ICC is 
that the time-consuming and costly process of creating new institutions can 
be avoided by referring situations to a permanent mechanism.46 In the 
event that sufficient will is gathered for the pursuit of international criminal 
justice, it would be more likely, and more prudent, for the Security Council 
to refer the situation to the ICC under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute 
than to establish a new institution for the same purpose. 
 
D. An Internationalized Criminal Tribunal 
 
The creation of an internationalized criminal tribunal, combining interna-
tional and domestic elements in terms of personnel and, perhaps, applica-
                                                                                                                      
43. See supra note 8. 
44. Immediate Establishment of a Syrian War Crimes Tribunal Resolution, H. Con. 
Res. 51, 113th Cong. (2013) (referred to committee).  
45. The total costs of the ICTY and the ICTR have been estimated to be 
$2,319,357,047 and $1,757,521,910, respectively. See Daniel McLaughlin, International Crim-
inal Tribunals: A Visual Overview, Report of the Leitner Centre of International Law and 
Justice (2013), available at http://www.leitnercenter.org/files/News/ Internation-
al%20Criminal%20Tribunals.pdf.  
46. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 












ble law, would provide another possible venue for justice.47 In August 
2013, a group of international experts put forward a proposal for the estab-
lishment of such a tribunal.48 The tribunal would have its seat in Damascus, 
Syria.49 Its purpose, according to the proposal, would be to “prosecute 
those most responsible for atrocity crimes committed in Syria by all sides 
of the conflict when the political situation permits, presumably following a 
change in government.”50 The tribunal is envisaged to work alongside the 
ordinary criminal and military courts of Syria, which would oversee the 
prosecution of lower level perpetrators. It also could possibly form part of 
a multilayered institutional arrangement, operating at a midway point be-
tween domestic criminal courts and the ICC if a referral is made and the 
Court’s admissibility criteria are satisfied.    
The establishment of an internationalized criminal tribunal would pro-
vide a possible route to justice in the absence of domestic or international 
trials. In some respects, trials before an internationalized mechanism may 
be considered preferable to purely international or domestic trials. One ad-
vantage of an internationalized criminal tribunal is its ability to combine 
international and local personnel. The proposal for an internationalized 
tribunal for Syria provides that international personnel such as judges or 
advisers would work alongside domestic staff.51  
Whilst the involvement of local personnel could enhance the sense of 
domestic ownership and impact of proceedings within the local popula-
tion,52 the participation of international personnel could bring expertise and 
increase the perceived independence and impartiality of the criminal justice 
process.53 The combination of international and domestic personnel could 
also allow for an exchange of knowledge and expertise which may ultimate-
                                                                                                                      
47. See supra note 9.  
48. The Draft Statute for a Syrian [Extraordinary] [Special] Tribunal to Prosecute 
Atrocity Crimes) can  be found in the Chautauqua Blueprint for a Statute for a Syrian Ex-
traordinary Tribunal to Prosecute Atrocity Crimes (Aug. 27, 2013), available at 
http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ Chau-
tauqua-Blueprint1.pdf [hereinafter Chautauqua Blueprint]. 
49. Id., art. 3. 
50. Id., at 1. 
51. Id., art. 5.  
52. Lindsay Raub, Positioning Hybrid Trials in International Criminal Justice, 42 INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 1013, 1017, 1041–44 (2009). See also Laura A. Dickinson, The 
Promise of Hybrid Court 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 295, 306 (2003).  













ly strengthen domestic capacity to oversee the investigation and prosecu-
tion of international crimes.54  
Although the creation of an internationalized criminal tribunal for Syria 
has many potential advantages, it also raises a number of concerns. One 
issue is that the involvement of victors in the prosecution of the defeated 
could result in biased and unfair trials. Other internationalized tribunals, 
such as the Iraqi High Tribunal and the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, have been criticized on this basis.55 A way of avoiding 
accusations of victors’ justice would be to couple the establishment of an 
internationalized criminal tribunal with a referral to the ICC.56 This would 
allow the ICC to address the most politically sensitive, and possibly desta-
bilizing, cases in an independent and impartial manner and reduce the po-
tential for allegations of bias. It would, of course, be dependent on the will 
of the post-conflict government (or the Security Council) to make such a 
referral. Previous tribunals have also faced challenges in the form of finan-
cial instability, coordination between their international and national com-
ponents and difficulties in securing the cooperation of local authorities or 
the authorities of third States.57 An internationalized tribunal for Syria 
could encounter similar obstacles. If it does, the likelihood it will render 
justice could be significantly reduced. 
 
E. The Domestic Courts of Third States 
 
Individuals responsible for the commission of international crimes in Syria 
could also be brought to justice before the courts of third States. The prin-
ciple of universal jurisdiction provides a basis on which States can exercise 
                                                                                                                      
54. Raub, supra note 52, at 1043; Dickinson, supra note 52, at 307.  
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criminal jurisdiction over certain offenses despite the lack of a territorial or 
nationality nexus with the offense.58 A number of States have used the 
principle to oversee the prosecution of individuals for the commission of 
international crimes.59 Since the principle of universal jurisdiction applies to 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, it would be applicable to crimes 
committed on Syrian territory.60 The exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
third States may provide a route to justice in the event that domestic courts 
fail to investigate and prosecute and an international(ized) institution is not 
given jurisdiction.  
It is unlikely, however, that a large number of perpetrators would be 
tried before the domestic courts of third States. First, a third State must 
have enacted domestic laws enabling it to investigate and prosecute on the 
basis of universal jurisdiction.61 Second, the third State would need to be in 
possession of sufficient evidence and have access to witnesses before it 
could carry out a successful prosecution.62 This would entail the coopera-
tion of the territorial State, which may not be forthcoming. Third, the do-
mestic law of the third State may require presence of the accused on the 
territory for jurisdiction to be exercised.63 Even if trials in absentia are per-
mitted under its domestic law, such trials are likely to be criticized on hu-
man rights grounds.64  Moreover, difficulties can be expected in gaining 
access to evidence if the reason for the absence of the accused is connected 
to refusal of the territorial State to permit extradition.65 Finally, as affirmed 
by the I.C.J. in the Arrest Warrant Case, sitting government officials are im-
mune from prosecution in the courts of third States during their term of 
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office.66 Consequently, whilst it is possible for third States to prosecute in-
dividuals for crimes committed during the conflict in Syria, other mecha-
nisms are likely to play a more significant role in the fight against impunity.  
 
III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
Justice for the crimes committed during the course of the conflict in Syria 
is likely to be pursued in a number of different arenas.67 A combination of 
accountability mechanisms may, indeed, be desirable. There are clear bene-
fits to the prosecution of higher-level perpetrators before the ICC and an 
internationalized criminal tribunal, whilst lower level perpetrators are ad-
dressed by domestic criminal courts. A multi-layered institutional arrange-
ment would allow the benefits of local trials to be realized and at the same 
time ensure that the highest level perpetrators are tried fairly and impartial-
ly before an international mechanism in a manner that is less likely to dis-
rupt a fragile peace settlement. The potential for several judicial mecha-
nisms to exercise jurisdiction in relation to the crimes committed in Syria 
raises interesting questions about the nature of the institutional relationship 
between those mechanisms and the distribution of cases between them.  
Regardless of whether or not the situation in Syria is referred to the 
ICC or an internationalized court is established, domestic courts will have 
an important role to play in the fight against impunity for crimes commit-
ted throughout the course of the conflict. Practice to date has shown that 
international and internationalized mechanisms are only able to oversee the 
trial of a relatively small number of high-level perpetrators and would be 
unable to address all the crimes that are understood to have been commit-
ted on Syrian territory. Thought must, therefore, be given to the construc-
tion of domestic capacity to investigate and prosecute international crimes 
as part of the post-conflict reconstruction process.  
It is possible for international and internationalized criminal justice 
mechanisms to play a role in boosting the capacity of domestic criminal 
courts through the exchange of information and expertise. The impact of 
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an internationalized criminal tribunal on the construction of domestic ca-
pacity would depend on the nature and degree of interaction between in-
ternational and domestic staff and efforts made to transfer expertise to lo-
cal courts. The ICC could also assist in the construction of domestic capac-
ity. Indeed, the principle of complementarity that underpins the ICC’s sys-
tem of justice has been understood to include a “positive” aspect whereby 
the Court seeks to promote trials at the domestic level.68 The ways in which 
the ICC can boost domestic capacity are, however, limited by the budget of 
the ICC as well as its judicial mandate.69 
Given the budgetary restrictions of international and internationalized 
courts and tribunals, and their limited mandates, other international organi-
zations, civil society and third States will be required to contribute in order 
to build a domestic system capable of seeking justice for those affected by 
the crimes committed during the course of the conflict in Syria. These ac-
tors must now work together to ensure that these atrocities do not go un-
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